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1. INTRODUCTION
Eight years after the publication of Aumann's [5] core equivalence
theorem, two notes in a same issue of Econometrica gave a sharper inter-
pretation to the theorem as a characterization of perfect competition.
Schmeidler [23] showed that in an atomless economy, where finitely many
commodities are traded, any allocation that is not blocked by ``small''
coalitions is in the core. More precisely, Schmeidler [23] proved that if an
allocation f is blocked by a coalition S via an allocation g, then, for any
=>0, f can be blocked via the same allocation g by a coalition S$/S, with
+(S$)=. Grodal [12] showed that we can further restrict the set of coali-
tions, to those consisting of finitely many arbitrarily small sets of agents
with similar characteristics, which are presumably easier to form and also
to interpret. Precisely, Grodal [12] established that an allocation belongs
to the core if and only if it cannot be blocked by a coalition which is the
union of at most l+1 subcoalitions, each of which has measure and
diameter less than =, where l is the number of commodities to be
exchanged in the market. These results imply that, for finite-dimensional
commodity spaces, the set of Walrasian allocations of an atomless
economy coincides with the set of allocations that are unblocked by
arbitrarily small coalitions.
The relation between the core and the Walrasian allocations set has been
studied in the context of infinite dimensional commodity spaces by many
authors (see Bewley [7], Ostroy [20], Mas-Colell [16], and OstroyZame
[21], on core equivalence, and AndersonZame [2,3] on core convergence).
In this context the relation between the two allocation sets becomes even more
interesting since the diversity in agents' preferences and endowments is now
potentially higher and, therefore, blocking may become more difficult, as
illustrated by recent examples of core-inequivalence and failure of core con-
vergence (see OstroyZame [21] and AndersonZame [2,3], respectively). It
becomes also interesting to examine whether the above epsilon-core equiv-
alence results are extendable to infinite dimensional commodity spaces.
Schmeidler's [23] and Grodal's [12] results rely heavily on Liapunov's
convexity theorem, which does not hold in an infinite dimensional set up.
This implies that an immediate extension of these results to atomless
economies with an infinite dimensional commodity space is not possible.
That is, the exact version of Schmeidler's result does not hold for atomless
economies with an infinite dimensional commodity space and, therefore, in
such economies the exact version of Grodal's result does not hold either.
C. Nu n~ ez [19] gave an example of an atomless economy, with infinitely
many commodities, where an allocation f is blocked by the coalition of all
agents via an allocation g, but there is no other different coalition blocking
f via the same allocation g.
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Despite this impossibility for obtaining both results in their exact strong
versions, we were able to find an extension of the theorem stated in Grodal
[12] to atomless economies with an infinite dimensional commodity space.
Precisely, we show that in continuum economies whose commodity space
is l, the space of bounded sequences, the following property holds: if an
allocation f is blocked by a coalition via an allocation g, then there exists
a natural number N=N( f ) and an allocation h, such that, for any =>0,
f can be blocked via h by a subcoalition which is the union of at most N
sets, each of which has measure and diameter less than =. As a consequence,
in a continuum economy with infinitely many commodities, it is enough to
consider the blocking power of arbitrarily small coalitions in order to
obtain the core. Thus, we also extend Schmeidler's [23] result to the
infinite dimensional setting. For this, we assume that preferences are
Mackey continuous.
Existence and core equivalence of equilibria for the commodity space l
(with prices in l1) were addressed by Bewley [6,7], under the assumptions
of convexity, monotonicity and Mackey continuity of preferences. Mackey
upper semi-continuous (usc) preferences are known to be upper myopic, in
the sense that gains in the distant future are negligible (see also Brown
Lewis [8] and Araujo [4]). Our extension of Schmeidler's [23] and
Grodal's [12] results uses also the Mackey lower semi-continuity (lsc) of
preferences, which corresponds to lower myopia: losses in the distant future
are negligible (in the terminology of Mas-Colell and Zame [18], example
4.1). Roughly speaking, lower myopia allows us to drop tails from the
blocking allocation and, subsequently, use Grodal's [12] finite-dimen-
sional approach. Under Bochner integrability of the endowments allocation
the argument can be carried out uniformly on agents and this is done by
passing first to a compact blocking subcoalition where preferences, blocking
allocation and blocked allocation are continuous, with respect to the agents.
Bochner integrability of the endowments allocation was identified by
GretskyOstroy [11] with physical thickness of markets. Our result asserts
that, for the space l, under Mackey continuity of preferences and
Bochner integrability of endowments, it is not possible to find outside the
Walrasian set, imperfectly competitive outcomes where the imperfection of
competition is exercised only by coalitions of arbitrarily small size (since
these outcomes should belong to an =-core) More work is needed to infer
that the result still holds for other commodity spaces, namely for the space
of measures, where the Walrasian allocations are known to resist
manipulation by arbitrarily small coalitions (see OstroyZame [21] and
Herve sMorenoPa scoa [14]) and may, therefore, be regarded as true
perfectly competitive outcomes.
Presumably, if the commodity spaces were other duals of separable
Banach spaces, we would need to strengthen the Mackey continuity to

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weak star continuity on preferences. Weak star continuity of preferences,
defined on duals of separable Banach spaces, has been extensively used in
the perfect competition literature, namely by MasColell [16], Hart [13],
Jones [15] GretskyOstroy [11] and OstroyZame [21], and was related
to economic thickness of markets in the last two articles.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we for-
malize the model and state the assumptions. In section 3, we extend
Grodal's [12] result to continuum economies with infinitely many com-
modities. In section 4, we present some examples. The first example shows
that the exact strong versions of the results in Schmeidler [23] and in
Grodal [12] do not hold, in general, when infinitely many commodities
are traded. The second example shows that, if preferences are not Mackey
continuous, then our main result does not hold either.
2. THE MODEL
Let us consider a pure exchange economyE=((I,A, +), Xt , |(t), p t , t # I),
with a continuum of agents and l+ as its commodity space. (I,A, +) is an
atomless positive, bounded measure space which represents the space
of agents. For simplicity, we assume that I is the real interval [0, 1], A is
the Lebesgue _-algebra of subsets of I, and + is the Lebesgue measure.
Each agent t # I is characterized by her consumption set l+ , her initial
endowment |(t)=(|j (t))

j=1 # l

+ , and her preference relation pt on
l+ _l

+ .
For any x # l, y # l1 , let (x, y)=

j=1 xjyj .
A function f: I l is Gelfand integrable iff for each p # l1 , there is
x # l such that, the real valued function t ( p, f (t)) is Lebesgue
integrable and I( p, f (t)) d+(t)= p } x. We say that x is the Gelfand
integral of f on I, and we write I f (t) d+(t)=x.
A function f: I l is strongly measurable if there exists a sequence of
simple functions ( fn) such that limn& fn(t)& f (t)&=0. A measurable
function is said to be Bochner integrable if there exists a sequence of simple
functions ( fn) such that limn I& fn(t)& f (t)& d+(t)=0. In this case, for
each measurable set S/I, we define S f (t) d+(t)=limn S fn(t) d+(t).
It can be easily shown that if f is Bochner integrable then f is Gelfand
integrable and the integrals coincide. We remark that if f is measurable,
then f is Bochner integrable iff I & f (t)& d+(t)<. (See Diestel and Uhl
[9], p. 45).
As in Bewley [7], an allocation is a Gelfand integrable function
f: I l+ . However, we will impose the stronger integrability condition on
the endowment allocation:
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(H.1) The map |: I l+ , which associates to each agent her initial
endowment, is Bochner integrable.
Moreover,
(H.2) For every measurable set A/I, with +(A)>0, there exists a
real number a=a(A)>0, such that A |j (t) d+(t)a for all j.
Remark 1. Araujo [4] studied the existence of equilibrium and Pareto
optimal allocations in economies with an infinite number of commodities
but with a finite number of agents. For this, he stated an assumption about
boundedness of endowments, whose natural extension for the case of a con-
tinuum economy is the next condition: (H) |j (t)a(t)>0, for all j, for
almost all t # I.
Observe that if | satisfies (H), then | also verifies our condition (H.2).
However, condition (H) is stronger than our assumption (H.2). For this,
let J be the set of rational numbers in the interval (0, 1), that is,
J=(0, 1)&Q=[qj | j #N]. Consider |, defined by |j (t)=|t&qj |, qj # J.
Then, inf j[|j (t)]=0, for every t # I. It is not hard to prove that
A|j (t) d+(t)(+(A))
24, whatever positive measure set A may be.
We will assume that preference relations are Mackey continuous. Let
C
*
(l+) denote the space of Mackey continuous functions on (l

+). Since
l, endowed with the Mackey topology is separable (see Appendix),
preference relations will be representable by Mackey continuous utility
functions. Actually, we will impose the following measurability condition
on the representations:
(H.3) The mapping U : IC
*
(l+), which associates to each agent t
an utility function U(t)=Ut representing her preference relation is
measurable (with respect to the topology of uniform convergence on
bounded sets of l+).
Remark 2. The above condition would follow easily from a primitive
measurability assumption on preferences if the consumption set were weak
star compact. Suppose the consumption set were M=[x=(xn)

n=1 #
l+ | xnH for all n] for some positive scalar H. On M the Mackey and
the weak star topology coincide (see Appendix). Let P denote the set of
Mackey continuous preference relations. We remark that P is a subspace
of the space of nonempty weak star closed subsets of M_M. We consider
on M_M the closed convergence topology. The standard assumption is
that the mapping P : IP, which associates to each agent t her preference
relation is measurable. As M, endowed with the Mackey topology (equiv-
alently, with the weak star topology), is compact and separable, there

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exists a continuous function U : P_MR, such that U (p , } ) is an utility
function which represents the preference relation p #P (see Mas-Colell
[17]). Let C (M ) denote the set of all real bounded continuous functions
defined on M and endow C (M ) with the norm topology. Then, the func-
tion V: PC (M ), given by V (p )=U (p , } ), is a continuous function
(see Wilansky [24, theorem 13.3.4]). Therefore, the composition of P with
V, given by U : IC (M ), is measurable.
A preference relation p is weakly monotone if x=(xn), y=( yn) and
xn yn for every n, then xpy.
(H.4) We also assume that the preference relation p t is weakly
monotone for almost all t # I.
We will recall other monotonicity concepts which will be referred to
when discussing work by other authors. Given a preference relation p ,
denote xoy if xpy but not ypx. A preference relation is said to be
monotone if x>> y (xn> yn for every n), implies xoy. This assumption
was used in Bewley's [6, 7] existence and core equivalence theorems.
Monotonicity is actually implied by a stronger version of monotonicity,
contemplated by BrownLewis [8]: x> y (xn yn for every n, and xi> yi
for some i ) implies xoy.
Remark 3. Mackey usc of preferences implies upper myopia: given any
bundle z, let z(n) be the bundle defined by z (n)j =0 for jn and z
(n)
j =zj
otherwise. Then, xoy implies xoy+z(n) for n large enough, since z(n)
converges to z in the Mackey topology (see Aliprantis and Border [1,
Corollary 13.29]). Slightly different concepts of upper myopia are discussed
by BrownLewis [8] and Araujo [4], all coinciding when preferences are
monotonic. It is well known that the Mackey topology is the strongest
topology with respect to which a continuous complete preorder is upper
myopic (this fact was shown by Bewley [6], under monotonicity; Hilden-
brand is quoted by Bewley for having suggested it). Mackey continuity of
preferences was shown by Araujo [4] to be a necessary condition for exist-
ence of individually rational Pareto allocations and, therefore, for existence
of Walrasian equilibria. Mackey lsc implies lower myopia: given xoy and
given z, then x&z(n)oy for n large enough.
An allocation f is feasible if I f (t) d+(t)I|(t) d+(t).
A coalition of agents is a measurable set S/[0, 1], such that +(S)>0.
A coalition S blocks an allocation f if there exists another allocation g such
that S g(t) d+(t)S |(t) d+(t), and g(t)ot f (t) for almost all t # S. The
core of the economy E, denoted by Core(E), is the set of all feasible alloca-
tions that can not be blocked by any coalition of agents.
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3. RESULTS
In the case of considering Rl as commodity space, Schmeidler [23]
shows that, for arbitrary =>0, it is enough to consider only coalitions with
measure less than =, in order to obtain the core allocations. Moreover, we
can further restrict the coalitions that are allowed to form. In fact, Grodal
[12] shows that an allocation belongs to the core if and only if it can not
be blocked by a coalition which is the union of at most l+1 coalitions,
each of which has measure and diameter less than =. Our aim is to obtain
an extension of these results to continuum economies with infinitely many
commodities. For this, we state a preliminary result.
Proposition 1. Let f be a feasible allocation in the economy E, such that
f Core(E). Then, there exists a compact positive measure subset S of I such
that S blocks f via an allocation g and the functions f, g and U are continuous
on S.
Proof. Let f Core(E). Then, there exists a coalition A and an alloca-
tion g, such that A g(t) d+(t)A |(t) d+(t), and Ut (g(t))>Ut ( f (t)) for
every t #A. By hypothesis, there exists a positive real number a, such that
A |j (t) d+(t)a, for all j. Then, without lost of generality, by (H.2) and
(H.4), we can consider that A gj (t) d+(t)a, for all j. This implies that
there exists B/A, with +(B)>0, such that gj (t)a, for all t # B.
For each positive integer m let g^m be the allocation defined by
g^mj (t)=(gj (t)&1m)
+=max[0, gj (t)&1m]. Now, the sequence g^
m(t)
converges to g(t) a.e. for the Mackey topology. To see this, recall that
Mackey convergence is uniform convergence on convex weakly compact
subsets of l1 . By Banach's theorem (see Appendix) a weakly compact
subset L of l1 is also norm compact. Then,
|( g(t)& g^m(t), y) | :
[ j: gj (t)1m]
| gj (t) yj |+
1
m
:
[ j: gj (t)>1m]
| yj |
E \ :
[ j: gj (t)1m]
gj (t)+
1
m+
for some E>0 such that &y&1E for every y # L. The expression inside
brackets obviously tends to zero as m goes to  and, therefore, ( g^m(t), y)
converges to ( g(t), y) a.e. uniformly on y # L. Then, by Mackey con-
tinuity of preferences, Ut ( g^
m(t)) converges to Ut (g(t)) almost everywhere.
By Lusin's theorem (see Bewley [7]), there exists a compact set
K1/[0, 1], with +(K1B)>0, such that the allocations g and f are con-
tinuous on K1 , with respect the weak star topology on l+ , and the map-
ping U is also continuous on K1 (with respect to the topology of uniform

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convergence on bounded subsets of l+). Actually, f and g are Mackey con-
tinuous on K1 , since the weak star continuity of f and g implies that f (K1)
and g(K1) are bounded subsets of l

+ and the corollary in Appendix
applies.
Thus, by Egoroff theorem, there exists a compact K2 , such that
Ut ( g^
m(t)) converges to Ut (g(t)) uniformly on K2 , and +(K1 &K2 &B)>0.
Let K=K1 &K2 &B. For each positive integer m, consider the allocation
g~ m, given by
g~ mj (t)={ g^
m
j (t)
gj (t)
if t #K
if t K.
By construction, there exists m , such that Ut (g~
m(t))>Ut ( f (t)), for all
mm . Moreover, A g~
m(t) d+(t)<<A |(t) d+(t). In fact, for all j it is
verified that A g~
m
j (t) d+(t)+$A |j (t) d+(t), for all $+(K )m, with
mmax[m , 1a]. Therefore, coalition A blocks f via an allocation g*, such
that A gj*(t) d+(t)+$A |j (t) d+(t), for all j, with $>0.
By Lusin's theorem, for each positive integer n, there exists a compact set
Kn with +(A"Kn)1n, such that U is continuous on Kn and g*, f are
Mackey continuous on Kn (by the same argument as before). On the other
hand, Kn |j (t) d+(t)) converges to A |j (t) d+(t), uniformly on j. That is
so, because, by (H.1), | : I l+ is a Bochner integrable function, and then
it is verified that
sup
j } |Kn |j (t) d+(t)&|A | j (t) d+(t) }
sup
j }|A"Kn |j (t) d+(t)}=" |A"Kn |(t) d+(t)"
|
A"Kn
&w(t)& d+(t).
The last inequality is due to the fact that the function given by t &|(t)&
is Lebesgue integrable, because | is a Bochner integrable function. Then,
there exists n , such that for all j, it is verified that |Kn |j (t) d+(t)&
A |j (t) d+(t)|<$, for all nn . So, the following inequalities hold:
|
Kn
g*(t) d+(t)
A
g*(t) d+(t)|
Kn
|(t) d+(t), for all nn .
Therefore, coalition Kn blocks f via g*, for all n large enough. Q.E.D
Now we prove the main result of this paper. For this, we need some
notation. Given x=(xh)h=1 # l
 and n #N, we denote by xn the element
of l defined by xnh=xh if 1hn and x
n
h=0 if h>n.
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Theorem 1. Let E=((I,A, +), Xt=l

+ , |(t), P t , t # I) a pure exchange
economy satisfying assumptions (H.1) through (H.4). If a feasible allocation
f is blocked by a coalition D via an allocation g, then there exists a positive
integer N=N( f ), and an allocation h, such that for any =>0, the allocation
f can be blocked via h by a coalition S=Ni=1 S i/D with diam(S i)= and
+(Si)=.
Proof. Let f Core(E). Then, there exists a coalition D and an allo-
cation g, such that D g(t) d+(t)D |(t) d+(t), and Ut (g(t))>Ut ( f (t))
for every t #D. By the previous proposition, we can take D compact,
U continuous on D and g, f continuous functions on D (for the Mackey
topology). So, there exists $>0, such that Ut ((g(t))&$>Ut (( f (t))+$
for every t #D.
Let us show that the sequence gn converges to g almost everywhere for
the Mackey topology. To see this, let L be a weakly compact subset of l1 .
So, by Banach's theorem (see Appendix), L is also a norm compact subset
of l1 . Then, for any =>0 there exists n such that j=n | yj |= for all y # L
(see Aliprantis and Border [1, Theorem 13.24]). Hence,
|( g(t)& gn(t), y) |= :

j=n
| g j (t) yj |&g& :

j=n
| yj |&g& =.
Therefore, ( gn(t), y) converges to ( g(t), y) a.e. uniformly on y # L. That
is, gn converges to g almost everywhere for the Mackey topology.
Now, let us see that Ut (g
n(t)) converges to Ut (g(t)) uniformly on t #D.
For this, given x # l+ , let (x
k) be a sequence Mackey converging to x. Let
tn a sequence converging to t #D. Then, limkUtn(x
k)=Utn(x) for all n,
and limnUtn(x
k)=Ut (x
k) for all k. Moreover, as U is continuous on D,
this last convergence is uniform on k (since Utn( } ) Ut ( } ) on C*
(l+), for
the topology of uniform convergence on bounded sets and, by Alaoglu
theorem, the sequence (xk) is bounded, since it is Mackey convergent and,
therefore, weak star convergent). Applying Moore's lemma (see Dunford
Schwartz [10, I.7.6]), limn limkUtn(x
k)=limk limnUtn(x
k)
=Ut (x). Now, since g : D l

+ is a Mackey continuous function and
gn(t) Mackey converges to g(t) for almost all t # I=[0, 1], we have
limnUtn(g
n(tn))=Ut (g(t)). That is, U( } )(g
n( } )) converges continuously
to U( } )(g( } )). Equivalently, U( } )(gn( } )) converges to U( } )(g( } )) uniformly
on compact subsets of D. (See Royden [22, Problem 9.40]).
In this way, we obtain that there exists N, such that for all t #D, it is
verified that Ut (g
N(t))>Ut (g(t))&$>Ut ( f (t))+$, where the first
inequality follows by Mackey continuity of preferences. Then, coalition D
blocks f via the allocation gN. We have the following inequality between

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N-dimensional Lebesgue integrals, D g
N(t) d+(t)D |
N(t) d+(t). Apply-
ing now Grodal's [12] N-dimensional argument, we obtain that for
any =>0, there exists a coalition S=Ni=1 S i/D with diam(S i)=
and +(Si)=, such that S blocks f via g
N, since S g
N(t) d+(t)
S |
N(t) d+(t)<S |(t) d+(t). Q.E.D
Remark 4. We have proved that in an atomless economy with infinitely
many commodities the following property holds: if an allocation f is
blocked by a coalition via an allocation g, then for any =>0, it can be
blocked via another allocation h by a coalition which is the union of at
most N=N( f ) coalitions, each of which has measure and diameter less
than =. In particular, we have proved that, in a continuum economy with
infinitely many commodities, it is enough to consider arbitrarily small
coalitions, in order to obtain the core. The result obtained by Grodal [12]
in the finite-dimensional case is stronger: in an atomless economy with a
finite number of commodities, if an allocation f is blocked by a coalition
via an allocation g, then for any =>0, it can be blocked via the same
allocation g by a coalition which is the union of N coalitions, each of which
has measure and diameter less than =. In Grodal's [12] corollary, N is
independent of f and is actually equal to l, where l is the number of
commodities in the economy.
4. SOME EXAMPLES
Example 1. This first example shows that the exact strong version of
Schmeidler's [23] result cannot be true, in general, for an infinite-dimen-
sional commodity space. That is, if S blocks f via g it is in general
impossible to find, for each =>0, a subcoalition with measure not exceed-
ing = and still blocking f via the same alternative allocation g. Then, the
result in Grodal [12], as it is written in Remark 4, does not hold either,
in general, when there are infinitely many commodities. The example was
inspired by Nu n~ ez's [19] observation, although it is constructed dif-
ferently.
Consider a pure exchange economy E=((I,A, +), |(t), Ut ( } ), t # I ),
with l as commodity space. For each j #N, let n( j ), h( j ) #N_ [0], such
that 2n( j ) j<2n( j )+1, and h( j )= j&2n( j ). The map |: Il+ that
associates to each agent t # I her initial endowment |(t) is given by:
|j (t)={
1
2
+C( j ) if t # B( j )=\ h( j )2n( j ) ,
h( j )+1
2n( j ) +
1
2
in the other case,
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where C( j )>0 verifies that C( j )=C( j$) if n( j )=n( j$), and C( j ) con-
verges to 0 when j goes to . This last property implies that | is
essentially bounded and Bochner integrable.
Every agent has the same preference relation, represented by the
following utility function
U(x)= :
j1
:( j ) log \
1
2
+xj+
where :( j )>0 verifies that :( j )=:( j$) if n( j )=n( j$), and j1 :( j )<.
Let :n=:( j ), when n( j )=n. It is important to notice that for every
agent t # I it is verified that U(|(t))n0 :n log(1+Cn), with strict
inequality if t #D=[k2m, m #N, k=1, ..., 2m&1], and equality in other
case.
The coalition I blocks | via the allocation x given by xj (t)=
xj=12+(C( j )2
n( j )). That is so because for all t # I it is verified that
U(x(t))= :
n0
:n \ :
2n j<2n+1
log \1+
Cn
2n ++= :n0 :n log \1+
Cn
2n +
2n
> :
n0
:n log(1+Cn)U(|(t)).
The strict inequality is due to the fact that (1+Cn 2n)2
n
>1+Cn ,
because (1+Cn k)
k>1+Cn , for all k.
Let S be a coalition, such that 0<+(S)<1. Let us see that S can not
block | via the same allocation x. In fact, we claim that the inequality
S x(t) d+(t)S |(t) d+(t) does not hold. To prove our point, assume
that S x(t) d+(t)S |(t) d+(t). Then, if we take j>1, 2
n j<2n+1, we
obtain that
+(S) \ 12+
C( j )
2n( j )+=|S xj (t) d+(t)|S |j (t) d+(t)=C( j ) +(S&Bj)+
1
2
+(S).
These 2n inequalities imply that (+(S)2n( j ))+(S&Bj). Let n( j )=n,
h( j )=i. Then, we obtain that +(S)2n( j )+(S& (i2n, (i+1)2n)), with
i=0, ..., 2n&1. Let us show that this can not hold for all i and n. For this,
consider the function F(t )=t0 /S(t) d+(t). By Lebesgue differentiation
theorem, we have that there exists B/I with +(B)=0, such that
F $(t)=/S(t), for all t # I"B. Let t0 # I"(S_D_B), and let am , bm>0,
such that
t0&bm=
km
2m
<t0<t0+am=
(km+1)
2m
, with m #N, km # [0, ..., 2m&1].

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Then, it is verified that
F $(t0)= lim
m
F(t0+am)&F(t0&bm)
am+bm
= lim
m
+\\
km
2m
,
km+1
2m +&S+
1
2m
.
Therefore, from the above inequalities we obtain that F $(t0)+(S). This
is a contradiction, because by Lebesgue differentiation theorem F $(t0)=0.
We have showed that the coalition I of all agents blocks | via the alloca-
tion x, but no other coalition, with measure less than 1, can block | via
the same allocation x. However, we notice that, for any =, the coalition
( 12&= ,
1
2+=) blocks | via the allocation x$, given by x$j=x j if j3 and
x$j=|j if j>3.
We also notice that x is a Walrasian allocation. In fact, (x, p) is a
Walrasian equilibrium if for p # l1 there exists *>0, such that
pj=* (:( j )xj ). Therefore, x belongs to the core of the economy.
Remark 5. Note that the preference relation in the above example,
defined by the utility function U(x)= j1 :( j ) log(
1
2+x j), is Mackey con-
tinuous, strictly convex, strictly monotone and even myopic, but the exact
strong version of Schmeidler's [23] result does not hold.
It is easy to see that example 1 remains true in any Banach lattice con-
taining an unconditionally basic sequence. For this, it is enough to take
C( j ) satisfying j>0 C( j )<. In particular, such example remains true in
the space C0 of all convergent sequences.
Example 2. This example shows that if preferences are not Mackey
continuous, then the thesis of theorem 1 does not hold.
Let Q& (0, 1)=[qn , n #N]. For each n let m=m(n), such that I
m
n =
(qn& 1m , qn+
1
m)/[0, 1]. Consider the set of intervals [I
m
n , n #N,
mm(n)]=[Ik , k #N]. By induction, for each k we take a set Hk/Ik ,
with +(Hk)>0 and Hk &Hk$=<, for all k{k$. Note that, for example, we
can take Hk as a positive measure compact Cantor set included in Ik , with
Hk &Hj=< for all j<k. Observe that, in this case, Ik"k&1i=1 Hi is an open
set which contains some open interval. Let A=I"k=1 Hk . Let
[Bk , k #N] be a family of disjoint sets, such that N=n=1 Bk , and
Card(Bk)= for all k.
Now the endowments and preference relation of each agent t # I are
defined as follows:
12
If t #Hk , then
|j (t)={
1 if j  Bk
1+
1
+(Hk)
if j # Bk
And for every t #A, |j (t)=1, for all j.
Every agent has the same preference relation, given by the utility
function
U(x)=lim inf
j
[xj].
We remark that the utility function U is not Mackey continuous on l+ .
To see this, let us consider the sequence xn given by (xn) j=0 if jn and
(xn) j=1 if j>n. Then, xn converges to zero with respect to the Mackey
topology (see Aliprantis and Border [1, Corollary 13.29]). Finally, notice
that U(xn)=1 for each n while U(0)=0.
It is clear that U(|(t))=1 for all t # I. It is also clear that the coalition
I=[0, 1] blocks | via the allocation x, given by xj (t)=2 for all j and for
all t.
Suppose now that a coalition S blocks |. Then +(S&Hk)>0 for all k.
This implies that S =I, that is, S is a dense subset of I. To show this it is
enough to prove that qn # S , for all n. For this, take qn and any mm(n).
Let Ik=(qn&
1
m , qn+
1
m). It is obvious that S& Ik{<. Therefore, if
S/Ni=1 S i , then 
N
i=1 diam(S i)1, and so the result stated in theorem 1
does not hold for this economy.
Remark 6. For the economy stated in Example 2, if a coalition S
blocks |, then S is a dense subset of I. Therefore, if preferences are not
Mackey continuous, then neither theorem 1 or weaker versions of it remain
true. Despite this, note that, for any =>0, if Hk (=)/Hk and +(Hk (=))=
=+(Hk), then the coalition H(=)=k Hk (=) blocks | via the same allocation
x, and +(H(=))=.
5. APPENDIX
We collect some results which are particularly helpful in this paper. For
this, let us consider the dual pair (l, l1).
First, we recall the Schur property notion for a Banach space.
Definition. A Banach space X has the Schur property provided that
when a sequence xn converges weakly to 0, then &xn& converges to 0 (or

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equivalently, if the collections of weakly compact and norm compact sub-
sets of X coincide).
Theorem (Banach). The Banach lattice l1 has the Schur property.
(See Aliprantis and Border [1, p. 440])
Corollary. The Mackey topology and the weak star topology coincide
on bounded subsets of l.
Proof. Let xn be a sequence which converges to x with respect to the
weak star topology on l. Let yn be a sequence which converges to y with
respect to the norm topology on l1 . Then, ( } , yn) converges to ( } , y)
uniformly on bounded subsets of l. This implies (see Royden [22,
Problem 9.40]) that the function (xn , }) converges continuously to (x, })
on norm compact subsets of l1 , and therefore, (xn&x, }) converges to
zero uniformly on norm compact subsets of l1 (by the same result in [22]).
Therefore, by Banach's theorem, we conclude that xn converges to x with
respect to the Mackey topology on l. Q.E.D.
Using the corollary above and the separability of the weak star topology,
we can take a countable cover of l by bounded sets and infer the
separability of the Mackey topology on l.
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